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The lncome Maintenance
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Between 1968 and 1978 four negative income tax experiments were
conducted; they were designed to measure labor supply and earnings.
The experiments were not designed to measure the effects of govern-
ment programs on such demographic behavior as marital dissolution,
fertility, family composition, or the decision to marry or remarry. Never-
theless, the data from the experiments have been used to analyze all
these family issues, and they are the subject of this paper.
The essential reform examined in the negative income tax ex-
periments was the extension of a guaranteed minimum income to poor
families with an able-bodied, non-aged husband or father as the poten-
tial provider. The income plans tested in the experiments were expected
to lead to reductions in the labor supply and earnings of the par-
ticipating married-couple families. By a twist of fate, however, the most
influential research finding of the experiments turned out to be not
about labor supply but about marital stability, a family issue. The find-
ings on labor supply showed reductions neither large enough nor small
enough to permit a definitive verdict about the negative income tax. In
contrast, the findings about marital stability appeared decisive.
The most important research on marital stability was conducted by
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma, based on the Seattle-Denver income
maintenance experimer~t.1 They concluded that the negative income tax
increased marital dissolutions, even though it had been designed to
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cover and assist families headed by married couples as well as families
headed by women. Indeed, their finding applied to a negative income
tax plan of the same level of generosity as the prevailing aid to families
with dependent children (AFDC) plan. This conclusion was unam-
biguously unfavorable to advocates of a negative income tax that would
cover married couples, for two important reasons. First, increased
marital breakups among the poor would increase the numbers on
welfare and the amount of transfer payments, principally because the
separated wife and children would receive higher transfer payments.
Second, marital dissolutions and the usual accompanying absence of
fathers from households with children are generally considered unfa-
vorable outcomes regardless of whether or not the welfare rolls increase.
Besides appearing decisive, the experimental findings about marital
stability were dramatic: the reported increase in marital splits was large;
it was counter to the outcome hoped for and expected by advocates of
the negative income tax reform; and it was counter to the predictions of
social scientists, and in particular economists. The dramatic findings
received considerable attention by the press and intense scrutiny by
scholars, who were skeptical but eventually accepted the findings.
This review of the negative income tax experiments offers two main
messages. The first is that the evidence about the issue of marital stabili-
ty is not decisive, or even persuasive. A second message is that family
issues such as marital stability are not well suited to experimental
research. The costs of a properly designed experiment seem too high.
Social Experimentation and Family Issues:
The Case of Marital Stability
The belief that marital stability among low-income families has been
adversely affected by our current welfare system seems firmly en-
trenched, even though empirical evidence in support of this belief has
been difficult to marshal.2 The general upward trend in divorce, separa-
tion, and female headship of families throughout this century3 applies
to all income strata; welfare programs are likely to be a factor in marital
stability only among the lower half of the family income distribution and
only during the last 25 years or so. In recent decades the generosity of
welfare programs systematically, although not steadily, increased in
ways that tended to lower the financial cost of marital dissolution to a
married couple with children. For a mother, the income from welfare,
which may include such in-kind payments as food stamps, Medicaid,
and housing subsidies, as well as the cash payments from AFDC, pro-
vides an alternative to her husband’s income. Welfare is likely in poor
families to exceed the income the wife receives from the husband.62 Glen G. Cain
Moreover, mothers in poor families are less likely to be capable of earn-
ing enough to be self-supporting at a level of income that exceeds
welfare. Finally, the availability of welfare essentially required the
husband-father to leave the marriage. For a departing father, the welfare
programs provided a de facto if not a legal alternative to alimony and
child support.
The increase in marital dissolutions is, however, only one of the
trends contributing to the increase in the proportion of families headed
by a woman. Increases in the number of unwed mothers, in the length
of time that mothers remain without husbands (regardless of whether
they are divorced or never married), and in the proportion of mothers
who establish separate households, are all sources of increased female
headship and of welfare recipiency.
In summary, the spread and increased generosity of welfare pro-
grams have reduced the price (or cost) of marital dissolution. The AFDC
program has been decidedly nonneutral regarding marital dissolutions
in its dispensing of transfer payments and other benefits.4 One advan-
tage widely claimed for a negative income tax was that it would move
the income maintenance system toward neutrality in marital decisions.
An Economic Framework for Analyzing Marital Stability
and the Negative Income Tax Experiments
To determine how marital stability among the population of already
married couples will be affected by a negative income tax, two regimes
must be compared:
~ The current system of welfare programs, referred to as AFDC,
which provides a net subsidy to a dissolved marriage, given the
presence of dependent children and assuming that the divorced
woman meets the income criteria for eligibility.
® A negative income tax regime, in which the current system is
amended to add welfare assistance for married couples who meet
the income criteria for eligibility.
We may assume for the negative income tax, as we did for AFDC,
that the only way it affects marital stability is by the income changes that
it brings about. Income changes in turn induce an "income effect" in a
regime where the income receipts are neutral with respect to marital
status, and a "price effect" that refers to the nonneutrality of the income
change with respect to marital status. Even with the simplifying
assumption that income changes are all that matter, three differences
between the negative income tax and AFDC are critical.
First, a negative income tax provides transfer payments for married
couples whose incomes are low. Economists and sociologists appear to
agree that modest increases in the incomes of married couples ought toFAMILY STABILITY 63
have a positive effect on marital stability. They find both an empirical
negative relation between family income and the probability of a marital
dissolution and a theoretical argument that pove, rty puts a strain on a
marriage, creating tensions and dissatisfactions that contribute to a
subsequent dissolution,s
Against this apparent consensus are one empirical finding and three
theoretical arguments. First, the time trend is not supportive of the idea
that rises in income are associated with increased marital stability. Sec-
ond, consider the plausible hypothesis that in many instances income
has a positive effect on divorce. After all, more income can make desired
divorces and separate living arrangements affordable. Third, income is
partly determined by personal traits that are themselves related to
marital stability, so the empirical positive relation between income and
marital stability does not imply a causal relation. Fourth, income from
welfare may not be "ordinary income," because it may carry a stigma
that is destabilizing.6 Although no direct evidence indicates such a
stigma effect is operative and destabilizing, that issue will be discussed
later. To summarize, a negative income tax carries a direct income effect
to the recipient married couple that is commonly viewed as promoting
marital stability. We may consider marital stability to be, on average, a
"normal good," but the evidence and theories appear only weakly
supportive.
A second major difference is that AFDC requires the presence of
dependent children for the receipt of transfer payments, whereas some
proposed income maintenance plans, including those adopted in the
Seattle-Denver experiment, do not. Because the presence of dependent
children in a marriage has a negative effect on marital dissolution, this is
an important difference in the two regimes. Restricting our attention to
families with children will solve two problems: it will provide the proper
comparison with existing AFDC programs, and also provide informa-
tion about the only type of negative income tax legislation that is likely
to be considered by Congress.
A third potential difference between the existing AFDC regime and
the proposed negative income tax plan involves the level of payments
received by a recipient family. To simplify matters, let us assume that
the payment depends on three parameters: (a) the income guarantee for
a family of a given size with no other income, (b) the benefit-reduction
rate, and (c) the differential in income guarantees for families of different
size and demographic composition. Regarding (c), let us assume that
the negative income tax guarantee amounts are structured so that ap-
proximate neutrality in the economic well-being of different-sized
families is achieved, if the guarantee were the only income received by
the family. Given such a structure, the higher the income guarantee and
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because more families are eligible and because recipient families will
receive larger transfer payments.7 In the following three comparisons of
predicted effects on marital stability, let us assume that the mother
maintains custody of the children.
1. If the negative income tax and AFDC plans are equally generous to a
mother who is without her husband, then a net decrease in marital
breakups is predicted. The main reason is that the price subsidy to the
unmarried state is reduced. The mother would gain the same amount as
before (under AFDC) if she is divorced or separated, and she would
receive more than before if she remained married. The same statement
applies to the husband-father, assuming that the negative income tax
plan, like AFDC, provides no income support to the separated husband.
If the husband were to become the provider of a new family and had a
sufficiently low income, then he could gain under a negative income tax
regime relative to AFDC. Let us assume that this possibility is sufficient-
ly remote that the potential gain is negligible.
The negative income tax experiments, including Seattle-Denver, did
differ from AFDC by providing an income guarantee and potential
transfer payments to the departing husband, even if he remained single.
This could be a major difference in the incentives to marital dissolution.
However, the break-even levels of income for single persons were so
low--around $2000 a year in 1970 dollars--that I will assume, unless
otherwise noted, that the actual benefits to the husband from this provi-
sion of the negative income tax are negligible and can be ignored.
Returning to the payments received by the divorced mother, the
term "independence effect" was used by Groeneveld, Hannan, and
Tuma in their studies of marital dissolution to refer to the woman’s
opportunity to use these payments to support herself and her children.
I prefer to speak of the price subsidy to being divorced and to focus on
the neutrality or nonneutrality of the subsidy: the payments received
when the woman is separated from her husband relative to the
payments received if she stays married. (As noted above, the price sub-
sidy also affects the husband by reducing his subjective obligation to pay
child support or alimony.)
A second reason for fewer marital dissolutions under the negative
income tax regimen relative to AFDC is that the married couple may
receive income transfers. Here the focus is on the receipt of income, per
se. Although the income effect does not have an unambiguous sign,
prevailing opinion suggests that it should be weakly pro-stability.
In summary, if the negative income tax is as generous as AFDC, its
price and income effects should lead to a reduction in marital splits.
However, only a negligible decrease would be predicted by those who:
(i) minimize the income effect; (ii) emphasize the fact that there has been
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tually few cases under our current welfare system in which a father
leaves his wife and children to permit them to qualify for transfer
payments. A negative income tax plan of equal generosity obviates tak-
ing this drastic step, but apparently there has never been any concrete
evidence that this behavior occurs.8 Of course, the lack of empirical
evidence does not mean that the events have not occurred.
2. If the negative income tax is less generous than AFDC, and the two plans
coexist, then again a net decrease in marital breakups should occur, but
the decrease should be even smaller than in the case of an equally
generous negative income tax. In brief, the negative income tax again
reduces the price subsidy to being divorced relative to being married,
although the ratio of payments received with and without a divorce is
smaller. Also, the presumed pro-stability income effect is smaller than in
the previous case, because the transfer payments to the married couple
are lower. Again, the potential transfer payments to the separated
husband under a negative income tax plan probably play no role in his
decision.
3. If the negative income tax is more generous than AFDC, then the two
theoretical effects we have considered have opposite signs with respect
to marital stability. The higher payments of the negative income tax
would dominate AFDC, and the latter would disappear for lack of
customers. Under the more generous negative income tax the payment
to the divorced woman is increased, but so is the payment to the woman
(and her husband) if she remains married. It is likely that the higher
level of payments to the woman if she divorces dominates the com-
parisons in her decision to remain married or become divorced. In this
sense, the "independence effect" of the income maintenance system
has been increased, implying that the effective price subsidy to being
divorced is increased, leading in turn to an increase in marital dissolu-
tions. A more generous plan increases the payments to married couples,
and the pure income effect, which is the second theoretical effect, may
be assumed to promote marital stability. Thus, a more generous nega-
tive income tax induces a net price change that promotes marital break-
ups and an income change that promotes marital stability. For reasons
discussed above, the price effect appears, a priori, to be the stronger.
A Broader Research Agenda for Marital Stability
The economic framework presented in the previous section was
overly simplified in several respects. A more realistic setting and objec-
tives will be useful for the reanalysis of the Seattle-Denver study and
will reinforce the message of the difficulty, perhaps intractability, of
social experiments on family issues.
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past research is the precise purpose of analyzing marital dissolutions
and other demographic outcomes of the experiments. Given our atten-
tion to welfare reform, one important purpose of an experiment is to
measure the fiscal costs of the reform. The costs will tend to rise or fall
depending on whether the reform increases or reduces marital dissolu-
tions. Unlike reductions in labor supply and earnings, however, the
change in dissolutions may have no effect on national income. For exam-
ple, a married couple that is not receiving welfare benefits may split,
after which the mother and children begin to receive welfare payments.
The divorced husband may continue working as much as he did before,
and the divorced wife may work in the market no less, and perhaps
even more, than she did before. The change in marital stability has no
clear effect on national income, even though its relation to program costs
is useful to measure.
We would also like to know how the well-being of low-income mar-
ried couples is affected by a change in marital dissolutions. With the in-
troduction of a negative income tax, married couples have an expanded
set of options regarding their living arrangements, and if they choose to
change them, we may presume that they are better off. This is, of
course, an application of the economist’s conventional assumption of
consumer sovereignty and rational behavior. The important point here
is that those who use the experimental results to design welfare pro-
grams are not going to be able to answer these questions about well-
being.
Finally, what is the effect on the well-being of the children in the
low-income families that experience a change in marital status as a result
of the negative income tax? This difficult question may require many
years to elapse before it can be answered. However, the social concern
about deleterious effects of marital breakups on the well-being of
children is sufficiently widespread that we may agree on the importance
of using the experiment to measure marital dissolutions in families with
children.
Given the two purposes of measuring program costs and marital
dissolutions in families with children, we are in a firmer position to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of different experimental designs.
A well-known weakness of the experiments, in terms of measuring the
demographic consequences of a nationally legislated negative income
tax, is their short duration--three to five years. Short-duration ex-
periments do not simulate the incentives of a permanent negative
income tax pertaining to demographic behavior. The apparent bias in a
short-duration experiment would be to understate the program’s effect
on the lifetime or steady-state incidence of births, marriages, and
divorces, since the present value of the subsidies from a short-duration
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affected that a short-duration experiment could overstate, rather than
understate, the impact of a permanent program.
To illustrate these biases, let us use the example of births. With a
permanent negative income tax, a married couple might decide to have
three instead of two children in response to the incentive of the extra
transfer payments they will receive during the 16 to 20 or so years that
the child is their dependent. Another incentive is that any reduction in
market earnings by the mother during the first 10 or so years of the addi-
tional child’s life may also be partially offset by an additional increase in
transfer payments. Clearly, the total value of these extra transfers under
a permanent negative income tax is considerably larger than the
payments received under a short-duration experiment. Thus, the
lifetime incidence of the births of additional children may be substantial-
ly understated in the experiment. But to illustrate an opposite bias
whereby fertility is overstated, consider all couples who plan to have an
extra child and who would do so whether or not a negative income tax
program exists. They might respond to the subsidy for births in the
short-duration experiment by bearing that child "now" rather than
"later." The short-duration experiment will, in these cases, overstate
the fertility effect of a negative income tax.
It is partly a matter of judgment and partly a matter of ingenuity in
analyzing the experimental data to determine which behavioral out-
comes are affected by these duration biases and to measure the bias.
Regarding marital dissolutions, we might suspect that teenage
cohabiting couples who did not have a legal marriage and had no
children would be more likely to alter the timing (as well as the inci-
dence) of dissolutions in response to financial incentives than would
legally married couples in their thirties with children present.
Another shortcoming of the negative income tax experiments
regarding the measurement of marital stability is the reliance on already
married couples. There are two problems here. One is that the relevant
population, given our interest in children in families without a father
present, includes women who have never married and some who are
divorced or separated and are not now married. A second and related
problem is that the measure of marital breakups with a sample of
already married couples may be biased even as a measure of dissolu-
tions among married couples. Both problems arise because a permanent
negative income tax may be expected to affect the decision to marry and
to remarry, as well as the decision to dissolve an existing marriage.
In considering the problem of the relevant populations in connec~
tion with the well-being of children, an example may illustrate some im-
portant issues. Let us define family stability in terms of the proportion of
time that children spend growing up with their mother and father pres-
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with an increase in family stability according to the following scenario.
Assume that a negative income tax that covers married couples increases
the proportion of young unwed mothers who marry the fathers of their
children. Assume further that these unwed mothers would not have
married in the absence of the program. These two assumed outcomes
are realistic because the current AFDC program, which provides transfer
payments to the mother only if she does not marry, is assumed to be
superseded by a negative income tax that provides transfer payments to
the mother if she does marry (and is income eligible). Finally, assume
that the proportion of these marriages that ends in divorce is higher than
the proportion of divorces in the rest of the married-couple population.
(This is also a realistic assumption.) The end result is that the overall
proportion of marital dissolutions is increased. Nevertheless, the
sumed marriages of unwed mothers who would not have married other-
wise increases family stability as defined by the presence of a father and
mother during the time of the upbringing of their children. The same ap-
parent paradox--an increase in family stability accompanied by an in-
crease in marital dissolutions--will result from a similar scenario applied
to remarriages of divorced mothers with children.
The above example illustrates the point that female headship is
probably more influenced by the current welfare system than is marital
stability. AFDC may not create female-headed families by providing a
monetary incentive for a father to leave his family nearly as often as it
does by discouraging the marriage of young unwed mothers and of cur-
rently divorced and separated women who are receiving AFDC and
other welfare assistance.9 Thus, the proportion of dissolved marriages
among women who marry could be reduced by the current system
because the system discourages certain marriages from occurring in the
first place.
Now consider a second bias in measuring marital dissolutions that
arises when examining only the existing stock of married couples. 10 Two
examples will illustrate the problem. First, assume that unmarried
women tend to have preferences in favor of singleness and against mar-
riage. If a negative income tax offsets the current incentive to singleness
and encourages more marriages among these women, we might expect
that the proportion of divorces in these marriages would be above
average. As a consequence, the long-run impact of a negative income tax
on divorces is understated by observing only the already married
population.
An opposite bias is also possible. Assume that the population of un-
married women is composed of two groups: one that is committed to
singleness and will not marry and another that is planning on marrying
but is taking more time to search more carefully. If a negative income tax
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group, we might expect fewer divorces among these marriages than the
average. If so, then the full impact on divorces is overstated by using
only the already married population in an experiment.
The data from the negative income tax experiments do not
realistically allow analyses to estimate the effect on (a) first marriages of
never-married women; (b) marriages of unwed mothers; (c) remarriages
of divorced women who are not currently married; and (d) subsequent
marital decisions. One problem is the small sample sizes of some of the
populations. A second is the short duration of the experiment relative to
the time horizons for these decisions. Again, the downward bias of a
short-duration plan, stemming from the lower present value of the
plan’s transfer payments, is competing with the upward bias from inter-
temporal substitution.
The case of new marriages by women and men without children is
worth special attention to reveal some of the complexities in using the
experiments to analyze marital behavior. The Seattle-Denver experi-
ment created unusual bonuses for new marriages. Imagine an 18- to
20-year old unmarried son or daughter in an experimental family who is
considering marrying or cohabiting. The first bonus to marriage is
eligibility for cash transfers for the couple, including an additional
transfer allowance that the experimental plan will assign to the new
partner. These cash transfers are not available to either partner under the
existing welfare system. It is also unlikely that a couple without children
would be eligible for cash transfers in a nationally legislated plan. The
son or daughter in a family eligible to receive experimental negative
income tax payments received a dowry to a new union unavailable to
other people in that "marriage market," and operative only for the
duration of the experiment. A second bonus to the new marriage or
cohabitation was that eligibility for experimental payments was extend-
ed to the new partners even if they later dissolved the union and formed
a second union with a different partner.11
My point is not to dwell on the difficulties in using existing experi-
mental data to test for effects of a negative income tax on new marriages
and subsequent dissolutions. Rather, it is that the already married
couples are the only feasible group to use to examine marital stability
and that there are inherent limitations in relying on this group.
Summary Points on the Experiments and the Issue of
Marital Stability
Several lessons can be drawn about the use of experiments to study
marital stability. First, the population of interest should include the
major groups that will be affected, and in particular, young persons who
are not married. Second, long-duration experiments seem necessary70 Glen G. Cain
both because the decisions about marital status and other family issues
involve l~ng-duration plans and consequences and because the biases
from using short-duration experiments are not clear in direction. Both
lessons would apply to the issues of fertility and marriage as well as to
marital dissolution. A third lesson, which is derived from our interest in
welfare reform, is that families with children should receive priority in
the design of the experiment, which should include a scheme in which
families without children are not eligible for payments. Finally, a
simplified economic framework for analyzing how a negative income tax
influences marital dissolution suggests two predictions:
® A negative income tax plan that is as generous as an AFDC plan or
less generous should promote marital stability.
o The predicted effect on marital stability of a plan that is more
generous than the existing AFDC plan is ambiguous. If the
negative income tax led to fewer marital splits, we could infer that
the gain to a married couple that stays together dominates the
extra gain that the mother would receive from the new plan !f the
marriage dissolves. If the negative income tax led to more marital
splits, then that latter gain would appear to dominate the decision.
The Experiments, with Special Reference to the
Seattle-Denver Experiment
The findings on marital stability that received by far the most atten-
tion are those from the Seattle-Denver experiment, which was the
largest of the four negative income tax experiments. Seattle-Denver had
the advantage of a five-year duration for a subsample of about 25 per-
cent of the married couples; most of the other 75 percent were in the
experiment for three years, as were the subjects in the other three
experiments. In fact, a small subsample of 169 families was assigned to a
third, 20-year duration, category. This assignment occurred after the ex-
periment had started and after these families had been originally as-
signed to three-year treatment and control groups. This 20-year group
was not analyzed separately in the research on marital issues, but will be
referred to later.
The Seattle-Denver experiment was the last to be completed, and its
research team of Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma reviewed and
reanalyzed the findings on marital stability from the other three ex-
periments. They concluded that these, individually or collectively, did
not show any clear impact.12 The sample size in the rural experiment
was too small for conclusive evidence, particularly in view of the low
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percent for both treatment and control groups. The Gary experiment
showed no effect on marital splits, but the Groeneveld, Hannan, and
Tuma team pointed to administrative and data flaws in this experiment
that led them to discard these results. The first experiment, carried out
in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, appeared to have inconclusive results
regarding marital splits when originally analyzed, but the researchers
reanalyzed the data and found evidence for a pro-split outcome that
supported the conclusions of their Seattle-Denver research. The New
Jersey study had a much smaller sample and more attrition among
married-couple families than did Seattle-Denver, however.
In the Seattle-Denver experiment, marriage was defined by
cohabitation, not by a marriage certificate or other legal sanction. A
marital dissolution was defined by a separation, not necessarily a
divorce, of at least 30 days and a statement from one of the partners that
a separation had occurred.13 Because this reanalysis is restricted to
couples with children, the problem of dealing with unmarried
cohabiting couples is presumed to be negligible. The Seattle-Denver
definition of a separation seems to set rather loose criteria, however, and
the effects of this on reports of a dissolution by experimental couples
relative to control couples will be discussed below.
Several features of the Seattle-Denver experiment appear either to
be obstacles to analyzing marital dissolutions or to imply reservations
about the research findings.
1. The addition of a training and counseling program. A large pro-
portion of the experimental group was given the option of a training
and/or counseling program (hereinafter referred to as the training pro-
gram) intended to improve the earning capacities of the adult family
members. In fact, the Seattle-Denver experiment consisted of four major
groups: families that were assigned only to a training treatment, families
assigned only to a negative income tax plan, families assigned to both
treatments, and control families. The training program complicates
measuring the effect of a negative income tax on marital stability in three
ways:
® No theoretical basis exists for predicting the sign of the effect of
training on marital stability. The effect may differ depending on
whether the husband or the wife receives the training.
o The sample size for the "pure" negative income tax treatment is
sharply diminished.
o Training programs are difficult to administer in a way that will
replicate how a nationally legislated program would be carried out
and will be as unobtrusive to the experimental subjects as a
nationally legislated plan. In contrast, a negative income tax plan
has relatively rigid parameters that permit the experimental plan72 Glen G. Cain
to match closely the design of a nationally legislated plan, and its
administrators play a relatively passive role.14
2. Small sample sizes for subgroups of interest. The Seattle-Denver
experiment was directed toward three major ethnic groups: white,
black, and Hispanic, the last primarily of Mexican heritage and living in
Denver. There were eleven different negative income tax plans, two (or
three) durations, and three training treatments. Problems of inadequate
sample sizes arise when these features are extensively cross-classified.
3. The short duration of the experiment. The short duration of the
experiments relative to the time horizons of such demographic behavior
as marriage and divorce led Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma to em-
phasize the five-year plan, on grounds that it "is more like a permanent
program than the 3-year treatment." In reporting that the three-year
treatment was about 75 percent as large as the five-year treatment, they
commented that "if the longer treatment more closely approximated the
effects of a permanent program, a permanent program would have even
larger effects than the 5-year program.’’15 These arguments imply that
the intertemporal substitution bias is dominated by duration bias; that
is, the five-year plan’s lesser duration bias gives it an overall larger ef-
fect. However, the reanalysis of the Seattle-Denver data presented
below does not support this finding.
4. Attrition. All research with longitudinal surveys has to deal with
attrition bias. The attrition proportion was about 20 percent in the
negative income tax experiments, including Seattle-Denver,16 and the
resulting biases may be serious. For example, the attrition bias of most
concern in analyzing labor supply is that families whose earnings declined
had an incentive not to drop out if they were in the experimental group,
but had no such incentive if they were in the control group. Thus, the
experimentals who did not drop out should overrepresent experimen-
tals whose earnings declined, especially those who lost their jobs and
had zero earnings. The controls had no such incentive not to drop out,
and controls did drop out more than experimentals.
The attrition bias might be even more serious in analyzing marital
stability than it is for labor supply analysis. A decline in earnings
associated with decreased labor supply will consist of a continuum of
small to large declines, whereas the decline in income for the mother
after the departure of her husband is often a very large loss. A woman in
the negative income tax experimental group whose marriage breaks up
has the option of receiving the higher of the experimental payment or
the AFDC payment. Women in the control group whose marriages
dissolve get nothing from the negative income tax before or after the
marital dissolution, so they have no economic incentive to continue
responding to the interviews three times a year. Attrition rates were
higher for control wives than experimental wives in the Seattle-DenverFAMILY STABILITY 73
experiment, and the ratio of attrition rates, control-to-experimental, was
higher for wives than for husbands. Experimental husbands were, of
course, less likely to receive transfer payments after a marital dissolution
than were their wives. The economic incentive was also evident within
the experimental group: wives assigned to the most generous plans had
lower rates of attrition than wives in the least generous plans.17
In summary, the sample of experimental families who remained in
the study should overrepresent marital dissolutions relative to the full
original sample of experimentals. The economic incentive for this attri-
tion bias is not present in the control group, and other things equal, we
might view the proportion of marital dissolutions in the remaining con-
trol group as an unbiased estimate of the proportion for the full sample
of controls. However, if we believe that personal problems and traits
that are associated with marital dissolution are also associated with attri-
tion, then, with no economic incentive in operation, those controls who
dropped out might well have a higher incidence of marital splits.18
5. Post-experimental design changes and the 20-year treatment.
After the experiment began, the initial design was changed in several
ways. First, shortly after the experiment began about 40 percent of the
control families were assigned to a five-year control status.19 The five-
year controls were thus exempt from the substantial attrition that occurs
early, and for this reason their attrition was much lower than that of the
three-year controls. To the extent that the frequency rates for marital
splits are affected by attrition bias, the rates for the five-year controls will
differ from those for the three-year controls.
Another change in design occurred after the experiment had been in
operation for about two and one-half years, when 169 families in Denver
were assigned to a 20-year negative income tax plan: 112 families that
were initially control families, and a second group, reassigned a few
months later, of 57 families that were originally three-year experimen-
tals. The latter maintained their originally assigned guarantee amount
and benefit-reduction rate.2°
Several complications arise from these reassignments, which are not
discussed here.21 As shown below, dealing with these complications is
facilitated by the statistical techniques presented by Groeneveld,
Hannan, and Tuma, which make use of multiple time periods for each
couple. This allows the couple’s particular and varying experimental
status to be matched with the time period under investigation.
6. Fraud, reconciliations, and reporting biases. Problems associated
with fraud, reconciliations, and reporting bias are all somewhat related.
The issues raised can become complicated, but neither the Seattle-
Denver researchers nor I view the observable evidence as indicating a
serious bias from these sources. The clearest case of fraud is where an
experimental couple falsely claims to be separated in order to collect74 Glen G. Cain
extra payments. Then the two main objectives of the experiment will
suffer from a bias. Obviously, the true number of marital dissolutions
will be overstated. The cost of the program is also overstated, assuming
the amount of fraud in the experiment exceeds the amount that would
exist in a nationally legislated plan. Reconciliations that occur during the
experiment or soon after the experiment ends might be an indicator of
this type of fraud. Reconciliations are also of concern because they affect
the time in which children have both parents present.
Finally, the reporting for experimentals and controls differed in
three ways. Controls reported their family composition once every four
months, whereas the experimentals reported monthly as well as in trien-
nial interviews. Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma dealt with this prob-
lem by using reported dissolutions from the same triennial interview.
However, this does not equalize the incentives the experimental families
have to report a dissolution or the likelihood that the multiple sources of
reports by these families would spill over to their interviews.22
In summary, the features of the Seattle-Denver experiment that I
find most likely to lead to important biases about marital dissolution in
relation to a negative income tax are (a) the confounding of negative in-
come tax treatments with training treatments; (b) the duration biases;
and (c) attrition. The problem of sample size is one of reliability, not
bias. The problem of the 20-year treatments is mainly that they create
ambiguity in interpretation. Fraud, reconciliation, and reporting issues
appear minor, but it is worth noting that the direction of bias is surely
that of exaggerating the effect of a negative income tax on marital splits.
The Seattle-Denver Results Concerning Marital Dissolution
In their final report on marital dissolutions, Groeneveld, Hannan,
and Tuma state that "the NIT plans tested in SIME/DIME dramatically
increased the rates at which marriages dissolved among white and black
couples . . ." They report an increase of "40 to 60 percent," and add:
If one wishes a single set of numbers to summarize our findings one
might choose the effects of the $3800 guarantee level treatments because it
is closest to the current system and to likely welfare reforms. [Adjusting for
attrition bias and restricting the estimates to couples with children] one
obtains estimates of 58 percent increases in dissolution for blacks and 51
percent increases for whites. These are estimates of the experimental-
control differences in the SIME/DIME population for the most feasible pro-
grams tested.23
As large as these increases are, they are smaller than those reported
by these researchers in earlier published articles. In the first article the
$3800 guarantee plan was estimated to increase "the annual probability
of marital dissolution . . . by 63 percent for blacks, 194 percent forFAMILY STABILITY 75
whites, and 83 percent for chicanas over what it would be in the control
situation.’’24 These results applied to the first two years of the experi-
ment. For the first three years of the experiment the estimates of in-
creases ranged from 57 percent to 129 percent (in a 1979 article) and from
24 percent to 114 percent (in a 1980 article).2s In the latter article the
results for Chicanos showed no increase in marital dissolutions for the
treatment group.
The increase in marital splits among experimentals relative to con-
trols was not attributable to a low proportion of splits in the control
group. The proportion of white, black, and Chicano couples in the con-
trol group who experienced a marital dissolution during the first three
years were 16, 24, and 20 percent, respectively. These percentages apply
to the originally enrolled couples who did not drop out and they reflect
the full three years of exposure to risk. The percentages are considerably
higher than those reported by Sawhill et al. for poor couples in the
Survey of Income Dynamics for a similar time period26 or for com-
parable controls in the New Jersey negative income tax experiment.27
Because the dissolution proportions among the controls in Seattle-
Denver were high, the even higher level of dissolutions among the treat-
ment group was noteworthy.
The Seattle-Denver results were surprising in two respects. First,
previous research on the impact of AFDC on marital dissolutions had
not prepared researchers to see a large effect from a negative income tax.
After all, no firm evidence had been established for a large destabilizing
effect of AFDC on marriages despite the fact that the system essentially
provided "permanent" benefits to a wife if her marriage dissolved and
no benefits to a married couple,z8 The Seattle-Denver experiment showed
a large destabilizing impact from a program that did provide benefits to
a couple that stayed together.
One possibility could have been that the destabilizing effect was
attributable to the relative generosity of the negative income tax plans.
In other words, the price effect was so large in its negative impact on
stability that it dominated any positive income effect. Actually, this was
not the case. In the second surprising result, the least generous negative
income tax plans, which offered about the same or lower cash payments
as did AFDC, induced the largest destabilizing effect, while the most
generous plan had essentially no destabilizing effect. This is the op-
posite of the theoretically expected result discussed earlier.
The researchers rationalized the large destabilizing impact of the
low-payment plan by suggesting a negligible income effect associated
with the payments to the intact couple, while emphasizing a large price
or "independence" effect of the payment to the divorced mother,z9
(The relative sizes of the income and independence effects are claimed to
be reversed for the high-payment plan.) Although the ostensible pay-76 Glen G. Cain
ment to the divorced mother from the low-payment plan is no more
than that available under AFDC, Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma sug-
gest that the negative income tax payment is worth more because it car-
ries less stigma, it is more certain to be received, and it involves low
transaction costs because the woman does not have to file and wait for
AFDC benefits.3°
These reasons do not appear persuasive as explanations for a
steady-state increase in "permanent" dissolutions, defined here as
those dissolutions that prevail for many months. Instead, the explana-
tions appear to apply to the timing of the dissolution rather than to its
eventual incidence. The low transactions costs, for example, should only
affect the timing. The fact that the woman may receive immediate
monthly payments from the negative income tax plan increases the pres-
ent value of the total payments received. However, this increase is trivial
relative to the present value of AFDC payments because the latter are
"permanent" and include noncash benefits, whereas the negative in-
come tax cash payments will terminate within a year or two for most
three-year plans and within three years or so for most five-year plans.
Similarly, the certainty of the negative income tax payments should be
important, if at all, only with respect to the timing of the marital dissolu-
tion.31
We do not have direct evidence for a stigma effect that discounts
AFDC payments, and if we did we would need to know how a legislated
negative income tax plan would enroll and monitor its participants to
determine whether its administration would eliminate any stigma in
receiving payments.32 Apparently, many of the experimental families
who were already receiving AFDC in Seattle-Denver were unwilling to
shift to the negative income tax plans even when the latter paid larger
cash transfer payments. These AFDC recipients did not want to jeopar-
dize their Medicaid benefits or, in some cases, housing subsidies.33 Per-
sons already on AFDC may be inured to stigma, but their reluctance to
shift to higher-paying negative income tax plans casts doubt on the
strength of the stigma effect. Again, the stigma of AFDC might delay a
woman’s shift from receiving negative income tax payments to receiving
AFDC benefits when the latter are larger, but this behavior implies that
the negative income tax plan is affecting only the timing of the split, not
its incidence.
Expressing these doubts about the explanation Groeneveld, Hannan
and Tuma offer for their surprising results does not refute their explana-
tion. Indeed, rather than attempt a thorough analysis of their explana-
tions, the next section presents a reanalysis of their data.FAMILY STABILITY 77
An Empirical Reanalysis of the Seattle-Denver Data
The empirical reanalysis of the Seattle-Denver data presented in this
paper will concentrate on couples with children and on marital dissolu-
tions as the outcome of interest.34
The techniques of analysis follow closely the pioneering use by
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma of "event-history analysis," which
appears preferable to any other statistical procedure for summarizing
the results. These techniques focus attention on the rate of dissolution;
that is, the sample’s proportion of dissolutions per unit of time. The
time-unit may be a year or as brief as a day, because the calendar date of
the dissolution is recorded in the Seattle-Denver data. Remarriages,
reconciliations, and subsequent dissolutions are not analyzed. The first
dissolution ends the couple’s record.
An important reason for using the rate instead of just measuring the
incidence of a dissolution is that the treatment and control groups are
exposed to the risk of dissolution for varying lengths of time. Even
groups in the experiment for the same intended duration, whether
three, five, or 20 years, may experience differential attrition. In par-
ticular, more attrition on the part of the control group could yield a
spuriously lower incidence of dissolutions, and this bias would be all the
greater if the control couples were more likely to divorce or separate
after they dropped out of the experiment.
What is less obvious, however, is that the rate measure may bias (or
exaggerate) marital dissolutions of treatment couples relative to control
couples in the context of a short-duration experiment. As discussed
earlier, the short-duration experiment provides an artificial incentive to
divorce earlier rather than later. Previously, this intertemporal substitu-
tion bias was cited as a reason why the incidence of dissolution during a
three-year experimental period might be higher than the incidence for
the same three-year period under a permanent plan. The rate measure
could increase this bias because even the same number (incidence) of
dissolutions in a three-year period will produce different rates--a higher
rate when the dissolutions occur early.
Table 1 illustrates these distinctions between rates and incidence,
early and late dissolutions, and records with and without attrition. A
hypothetical example of four couples (A,B,C, and D) and three periods
is shown. Case II relative to Case I shows that later dissolutions yield a
lower rate for the same incidence level. Case III relative to Case II shows
how attrition will tend to understate the dissolutions if an incidence
measure is used, whereas the rate will adjust for the varying exposures
to risk.78 Glen G. Cain
Case IV relative to Case I is interesting because it reveals how the
same rate may accompany different levels of incidence. Note that
although Case I has the same rate as Case IV, one dissolution per four
time-periods of exposure, there are only two dissolutions among the
four couples in Case I and three dissolutions in Case IV. Our concern
about the disruption of intact marriages and the consequences of this for
the upbringing of children probably implies that Case IV is "worse."
The important point is that a short-duration experiment should tend to
produce Case I-type outcomes among the treatment group.
Table 1
Illustrative Examples of Differences in the Incidence
and Rate of Marital Dissolutions


















0 = no marital dissolution
X = post-event period (no further record)
ATT = attrited (no information)
(Data beyond three years are unavailable.)
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Incidence: 3/4 = .75
Rate: 3/12 = .25
A First Look, Using The Seattle Data
The yearly records of the Seattle experiment may be shown with
three tables similar in form to Table 1. This will permit us to see the in-
gredients of analysis that will later be summarized in a statistical model,
and the simplicity of the tables will facilitate some important observa-
tions about the data. Table 2 shows the number of couples and their
record of attrition from the experiment. Tables 3 and 4 show the year-by-
year record of marital dissolutions for white and black couples respec-
tively.FAMILY STABILITY 79
Assignments to the four experimental groups were random within
the stratifications of city, ethnicity, and the estimated level of the
families’ normal incomes.35 As we shall see, income is not a major deter-
minant of marital dissolution in this sample, so ignoring this variable in
these tables still allows a fairly accurate picture of marital dissolutions in
Seattle in response to the experimental plans. Adding the income
variable would further dilute the already thin cell sizes. The five-year
experimental cells are particularly small.
Seattle data are easy to interpret because the sample was stratified
with only two ethnic groups and two duration groups. No family units
were shifted among plans as they were in Denver. However, Seattle’s
outcomes are quite different from those in Denver in certain key
respects. An overall assessment must wait for the statistical model for
Seattle and Denver combined.
Table 2 shows Seattle’s number (N) of originally married couples
and the number who dropped out of the experiment, for each race for
the four experimental statuses and the two duration groups. Overall,
the attrition rate is 16 percent for the entire number (163 couples out of
1001), and the rates for the groups are: 20 percent for controls, 17 per-
cent for the trainee group (TR), 15 percent for the pure negative income
tax (NIT) group, and 13 percent for the group receiving the combined
treatment of a negative income tax and training (NIT x TR). A striking
Table 2
Attrition in Seattle Negative Income Tax Experiment, by Treatment,
Race, and Duration of Assignment
Experimental Treatment
:~acial Group Control Training NIT NIT x Training
~nd Duration
3f Experiment N ATT R N ATT R N AT[ R N AFr R
7Vhite
3-year 103 19 .18 96 12 .12 79 9 .11 148 18 .12
5-year 69 4 .06 33 4 .12 35 3 .09 45 5 .11
Total 172 23 .13 129 16 .12 114 12 .11 193 23 ,12
3lack
3-year 47 24 .51 57 11 .19 50 8 .16 109 14 .13
5-year 44 6 .14 28 9 .32 25 9 .36 33 8 .24
Total 91 30 .33 85 20 .24 75 17 .23 142 22 .15
Total
3-year 150 43 .29 153 23 .15 129 17 .13 257 32 .12
5-year 113 10 .09 61 13 .21 60 12 .20 78 13 .17
Total 263 53 .20 214 36 .17 189 29 .15 335 45 .13
Notes: N = number of couples at beginning of experiment. AFF = Attrition (number of couples
who dropped out). R = rate of attrition (percentage dropping out). Table refers to originally mar-
ried couples with children under age 21 at beginning of experiment. Cases where a spouse died
during the experiment have been excluded.80 Glen G. Cain
finding is that the controls who were in the three-year duration group
had a rate of attrition about three times that of the five-year controls (29
percent compared to 9 percent, for whites and blacks combined), despite
the fact that the five-year controls had two additional years of exposure
to the risk of dropping out of the experiment. The reason is surely that
the five-year controls were assigned after the experiment had begun and
after the considerable attrition in the beginning months of the experi-
ment had occurred. Clearly, the designation to three-year and five-year
control status was nonrandom with respect to attrition. In all subse-
quent analysis, all the controls in each year of their participation in the
experiment are pooled to guard against the assignment being nonran-
dora with respect to the propensity to divorce or separate. Together they
should constitute a random group.
Tables 3 and 4 show the essential information on marital dissolu-
tions for white and black couples. For each year and for each experimen-
Table 3
Annual Rates of Marital Dissolution among Whites in Seattle Experimenta
Experimental Treatment
Duration and Controlb Training NIT NIT x Training
Year in
Experiment N D R N D R N D R N D R
3-yr, first 166 10 .060 93 7 .075 78 5 .064 143.5 10 .070
3-yr, second 149.5 9 .060 80.5 6 .075 71 7 .099 128 16 .125
3-yr, third 136 12 .088 72.5 4 .055 60.5 5 .083 107.5 6 .056
5-yr, first included above 31.5 3 .O95 36 2 .056 44 6 .136
5-yr, second included above 27 1 .037 33.5 3 .090 37.5 3 .080
5-yr, third included above 25.5 2 .078 29.5 1 .O34 33.5 2 .05:
5-yr, fourth 50 1 .020 24 1 .042 27.5 3 .109 31 0 .000
5-yr, fifth 49 1 .019 23 0 .000 24 0 .000 30.5 1 .03:
Totals
3-yr 451.5 31 .069 246 17 .069 209.5 17 .081 379 32 .034
5-yr 550.5 33 .060 131 7 .O53 145.5 9 .062 176.5 12 .068
Total 550.5 33 .060 377 24 .064 355 26 .073 555.5 44 .079
Control
Dissolution Rate Ratiod Ratio Ratio
(Adjusted for No Att. No Att, No Att.
Attritionc) Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj.
3-yr .070 1.00 .99 1.17d 1.13d 1.22 1.16
5-yr .062 .88 .88 1.03 .9O 1.13 ,94
Total .062 1.07 1.03 1.22 1.11 1.32 1.16
Notes follow Table 4. See also Notes to Tables 5 and 6
N = number of person- (couple-) years of exposure to risk. In the first year, N = the number
of couples at the beginning of the experiment minus one-half of the number of couples dropping
out who did not divorce or separate.
D = number of marital dissolutions.
R = rate of marital dissolution, measured as the proportion of dissolutions per years at risk.FAMILY STABILITY 81
Table 4
Annual Rates of Marital Dissolution among Blacks in Seattle Experimenta
Experimental Status
Duration and Controlb Training NIT x Training
Year in N     D    R     N     D                      R     N     D    R Experiment
3-yr, first 83.5 8 .096
3-yr, second 65 6 .092
3-yr, third 53 3 .057
5-yr, first included above
5-yr, second included above
5-yr, third included above
5-yr, fourth 30.5 2 .066



















































































N = number of person- (couple-) years of exposure to risk. In the first year, N = the number
of couples at the beginning of the experiment minus one-half of the number of couples dropping
out who did not divorce or separaIe,
D = number of marital dissolutions.
R = rate of marital dissolution, measured as the proportion of dissolutions per years at risk.
Notes to Tables 3 and 4
aTables refer to originally married couples, with children under 21 at the beginning of the ex-
periment: cases where spouse died during the duration of the experiment are excluded.
Dropouts contribute to the total dissolution rate (or proportion) during the year that they leave
the experiment by assuming they represent one-half year of exposure to risk. If they report a
dissolution, the dissolution is included in the total number of dissolutions for that year.
bAli controls are aggregated during the first three years of the experiment. Only the five-year
controls are measured during the fourth and fifth years of the experiment.
CThe attrition adjustment has two parts. First, the dissolution rate is assumed to be 25 percent
greater among the control dropouts for whom no information is available. Second, the dissolu-
tion rate is assumed to be 50 percent less for experimental (treatment) dropouts who were assigned
to a negative income tax plan and for whom no information is available. No attrition adjustment
is made for the training-treatment group.
dFrom Table 3, the calculation of the two ratios for the NIT three-year sample of whites is
demonstrated as follows:
1.17 = .081/.069 = NIT average rate for the three-year group/ control average rate
for the three years.
1.13 = .079/.070 = The attrition-adjusted dissolution rate for the NIT group, assuming
the NIT dropouts with no information about dissolutions have a dissolu-
tion rate one-half as large as the remaining NIT couples / adjusted
rate of control attrition.
All other ratios in Tables 3 and 4 are derived in the same way.82 Glen G. Cain
tal group, the number of dissolutions is recorded along with the number
of person-years (or couple-years) at risk. A couple that drops out of the
experiment in any year is assumed to provide a half-year of exposure to
the risk of dissolution. A dissolution recorded for a couple that drops
out in a year is counted in that year. In the following year, only the con-
tinuing and still-intact couples are at risk. The three-year and five-year
treatment groups--Training (TR), Negative Income Tax (NIT), and NIT
x TR--are separately recorded. The controls are pooled in the first three
years, but only the five-year group is recorded for the fourth and fifth
years of the experiment.
Several interesting results in Tables 3 and 4 will be shown to hold up
in the final analysis when all data are used and when a number of
exogenous control variables are held constant statistically.
1. Looking at the average yearly dissolution rate and the ratio of
these averages to the corresponding control group, no consistent pat-
tern emerged regarding the three-year groups versus the five-year
groups or regarding three of the four experimental groups--control,
Training, or the NIT group.
2. The experimental group, NIT x TR, shows a higher dissolution
rate, and among blacks, the higher rate for the three-year experimentals
is statistically significant at conventional levels.36
3. The cell sizes are too small to detect a time trend in the dissolution
rates, although there is a hint of a downward trend in the experimental
groups, as, for example, when the third year is compared with the first
and second in the three-year groups, and the fourth and fifth years are
compared with the first two years in the five-year groups. Intertemporal
substitution will be examined below in more detail, although our full
analysis of the time-dependence of dissolutions is not completed.
4. In the light of earlier findings by Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma,
an unexpected result from the Seattle data is that the average annual
dissolution rates among the three-year NIT and NIT x TR groups are
higher than among their five-year counterparts. Moreover, the NIT/
Control ratios of the three-year dissolution rates are higher than these
ratios for the five-year dissolution rates. Again, intertemporal substitu-
tion is a possible explanation.
5. An adjustment for attrition bias can be demonstrated with these
data and it turns out to be a fairly minor adjustment. Couples who
dropped out and who did not report a marital split represent a certain
number of subsequent unknown person-years. In sensitivity tests, the
marital dissolution rate is assumed to be 25 percent higher among con-
trols who dropped out; say, .075 per year instead of .06. When this ad-
justment is used, the overall average dissolution rate of controls is raised
by .001 or .002, from, say, .06 to .061 or .062. In the next step, theFAMILY STABILITY 83
dissolution rate among dropout experimentals who were eligible for
negative income tax payments is assumed to be 50 percent smaller than
the rate among experimentals who stayed; say, .03 instead of .06. Ap-
plying this rate to the unknown person-years among experimentals who
dropped out serves in practice to lower the overall average dissolution
rate of the NIT or NIT x TR groups by .002 to .005. Thus, the attrition
adjustment could change the experimental/control ratio of dissolution
rates by around 5 to 10 percentage points; for example, from .06/.06 = 1
to .058/.061 = .95 or to .056/.062 = .90. These calculations merely illus-
trate the sensitivity of the estimates to an attrition adjustment. They will
now be set aside until the concluding section of the paper.
The Full Sample and The Use of an Exponential Model
Table 5 provides a relatively complete summary of the dissolution
"effects" of the various experimental statuses, using the full informa-
tion for both cities, all five years of the regular experiment, and the sixth
and seventh years for the small number of Denver couples assigned to
the 20-year duration plans. Also, the full set of control variables used by
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma is included in the statistical model. The
reported coefficients under the column headed b show the approximate
percentage effects of the independent variables on the marital dissolu-
tion rate. The coefficients of the experimental categorical variables are
related to the "multipliers" of the dissolution rate of the omitted base
group of controls.37
In Table 5 the original numbers of couples for each group in each
plan’are shown in brackets, and we see the small number of families in
the 20-year plans. All of these 20-year couples were originally in another
group, so the total number of couples at the beginning of the experiment
is given by the totals for the 3- and 5-year groups, along with the con-
trols: 272 white controls, 182 black controls, and 93 Chicano controls.
Hence, the number of observations per group may well be too small for
the analysis of a relatively uncommon event like marital dissolutions.
(Table 6 shows the statistical results when using fewer groups but with
larger cell sizes.) The general lack of statistical significance also
discourages spending much effort in investigating the effects of the still
smaller subgroups of experimental treatments, such as the three training
programs and the eleven (or even three) negative income tax plans.
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma extensively analyzed the results for
high, medium, and low negative income tax plans.
The statistical model underlying the results shown in Tables 5 and 6
is the discrete-time analogue of the continuous-time model used by
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma; that is, their exponential rate model.84 Glen G. Cain
Table 5
Estimated Effects of Independent Variables on Dissolution Rates:













Unreported -- 2.83 (.85)
Duration of
marriage --.08 (4.78)***
Wife’s age --.01 (.50)
Wife’s ed, 12 --.23 (1.71)*
Wife’s ed, 12 --1.16 (2.08)**
Young Children --.26 (1.40)
AFDC, pre .30 (1.74)*
TR x 3 x S .21 (.73)
TR x 5 x S --.08 (.21)
TR x 3 x D .12 (.39)
TR x 5 x D --.41 (.81)
NIT x 3 x S .19 (.69)
NIT x 5 x S .26 (.73)
NIT x 3 x D --.12 (.33)
NIT x 5 x D .06 (.20)
NIT x 20 x D .09 (.25)
(NIT.TR) x 3 x S .31 (1.36)
(NIT.TR) x 5 x S .13 (.40)
(NIT.TR) x 3 x D .20 ¢85)
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aSee the text for a specification of the statistical model to estimate the rate of marital
dissolution.
bb = Multiplier, approximately equal to the percentage effect of the independent variable on
dissolution. See text footnote 37.
n = number of couples at beginning of experiment; DF = degrees of freedom, based on
number of 6-month time periods per couple at risk (minus the number of independent variables).
Whites: n = 1120, DF = 7120; Blacks: n = 815, DF = 4732; Chicanos: n = 495, DF = 2960.
Clndependent variables are defined for their values at the beginning of the experiment:
-Duration of marriage in years.
-Wife’s age, in years.
-Wife’s ed (education): the category "less than 12 years of schooling" is the omitted category.
-Young children: 1 if a child under 6 years of age is present; 0 otherwise.
-AFDC, pre: 1 if wife had participated in AFDC in the year prior to enrollment; 0 otherwise.
TR x 3 x S = Training treatment only and 3-year duration and in Seattle. Other treatment statuses
are defined accordingly.
(NIUR) = The combined treatment of an NIT plan and training.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, two-tailed test.
**5 percent level.
**’1 percent level.FAMILY STABILITY 85
Table 6
Estimated Effects of Independent Variables on Dissolution Rates:
Summary Results, Combining Duration and Site Groupsa
Whitesb
Variable b t
Constanl -- 1.92 (3.36)* * *
Normal earnings
($ooo)
0- ! --.0! (.02)








marriage -- .08 (4.79)* **
Wife’s age --.01 (.59)
Wife’s ed, 12 --.23 (1.72)*
Wife’s ed, > 12 --1.17 (2.10)**
Young Children --.25 (1.39)
AFDC, pre .2g (1.66)*
TR .03 (.14)
NIT .16 (.82)
(NIT x TR) .17 (.97)
Blacksc
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aSee notes to Table 5. Denver = 1 if family lives in Denver, O ifin Seattle.


















Define P(t) as the probability that a couple experiences a dissolution at
time t, conditional upon the couple being at risk at time to The usual logit
transformation of P(t), related to a linear specification of explanatory
variables, is:
ln[P(t)/(1 - P(t))] = a + bx.
As the interval of time becomes smaller, the data approach continuous
time. The specification of the dependent variable that provides an exact
analogue to the continuous-time model is:as
ln[-ln(1 - P(t))].
Let y = In [ - ln(1 - P(t))]; T is a vector of treatment variables, and X is a
vector of exogenous determinants of marital dissolution. The statistical
model in Tables 5 and 6 has this double-log functional form and uses
discrete data for six-month time periods:
y= T’a+ X’]t.
Estimation is by maximum likelihood logit analysis, using the GLIM
statistical package.Table 7
Estimated Effects of Independent Variables on Marital Dissolution Rates (using the same samples and variables as
Groeneveld, Hannah, and Tuma)
White
GHT Cain GHT
b b t b t b t t
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NIT .41















































Denver = 1 if family lives in Denver; O if in Seattle.
Dur. Marr. = years married at beginning of experiment.
Age-W = age of wife; Age H =age of husband.
Ed-W = Wife’s education (years) Ed-H = husband’s.
Children, n = number of children.



























































































M-l: least generous training program.
M-2: more generous training program.
M-3: most generous training program.
M-5 yr: if training subsidy variable is for 5 years.
NIT = Pure NIT and NITxTR pooled.
NIT, 3 yr. = 1 if family was in NIT or NITXTR experimental


















This table is a replication of Table 5.1.A in Groeneveld, Hannah, and Tuma, "Marital Stability," Final Report, p. 367. The GHT columns refer
to a continuous-time model; the other columns refer to a discrete-time model.FAMILY STABILITY 87
Using time intervals of six months (instead of one year as in Tables 3
and 4), it is possible to replicate closely the results of Groeneveld,
Hannan, and Tuma when using the same data. See Table 7 for the
replication of their results for all originally married couples, including
those without children, for the first three years of the experiment.39
The outcomes of the experimental plans shown in Table 5 are not
easy to summarize. No treatment variables are statistically significant
among white and Chicano samples, and imposing zero coefficients on
all five variables defining any of the three experimental plans, TR, NIT,
or NIT x TR, does not significantly worsen the fitted relation. In terms
of the pure NIT plans, six of the 13 coefficients are negative, showing a
stabilizing effect on marriages, although all are statistically insignificant.
Seven of the 13 are positive, showing a destabilizing effect, but only one
is statistically significant: 0.88 for the 44 black families in the five-year
NIT program in Denver. The pure NIT plan does not show a consistent
destabilizing effect for any of the three ethnic groups.
The NIT x TR plan has a large and significant destabilizing effect, on
blacks. These plans have no statistically significant effects among whites
or Chicanos, although the direction of the effects for whites is mainly
positive. Finally, the five-year duration plans tend to be less destabilizing
than the three-year plans in most comparisons.
Table 6 summarizes the separate experimental plans for each ethnic
group, pooling the sites and durations to build up the sample size and to
summarize an overall effect of each of the three experimental treat-
ments. Of the nine experimental coefficients, only one is statistically
significant, .57 for blacks in the NIT x TR plan. Of the three coefficients
for the pure NIT, none is statistically significant, and one (for Chicanos)
is negative. The pure NIT coefficient for blacks, .27, is large enough to
cause concern, but it is not reliably estimated, and it is smaller in ab-
solute value than the statistically insignificant negative coefficient, --.30,
for Chicanos. A weighted average for the three ethnic groups, using the
sample proportions of couples in each ethnic group as weights, is .10.
For the relatively rare event of a marital dissolution, an effect of this
magnitude has no practical significance.
Summary
The results shown in Tables 5 and 6 do not justify the conclusion
that a negative income tax program, by itself, would lead to an increase
in marital breakups among married couples with children. Three telling
results argue against such a claim.
1. First, as shown in Table 5, the sample sizes for the cells that
describe the pure NIT plan are not large enough to warrant any con-
fidence in such a conclusion, unless the results for the different cities,88 Glen G. Cain
time durations, and ethnic groups were so consistent that the samples
could be pooled. But the results are not consistent even with respect to
sign.
2. Second, the summary estimate achieved by combining all dura-
tions and sites in Table 6 shows inconsistent signs and an overall small
quantitative effect (.10) for the pure NIT treatment.
3. Third, the results have not been adjusted for attrition bias or for
reconciliations. Attrition bias is, of course, unknown, and it is merely on
the basis of prior theorizing that the adjustments suggested earlier
diminished the dissolution rate among experimentals relative to con-
trols. If the reader agrees that an adjustment is called for, perhaps a
summary estimate would entail multiplying all the positive NIT coeffi-
cients by .95 and all the negative coefficients by 1.05. Reconciliations are
observable during the course of the experiment, and although they have
not been used in this paper, the findings of Groeneveld, Hannan, and
Tuma, which we have corroborated, show that reconciliations are more
prevalent among the experimental families. This indicates that a
measure based on the fraction of time that the parents are separated is
likely to show less instability than did the rate of first dissolutions,
which Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma and this study have em-
phasized.
Several qualifications must be noted about these conclusions regard-
ing the negative income tax and marital stability. One, which is probably
not serious, is that the reanalysis has not examined the paradoxical
result of Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma whereby the least generous
negative income tax plans had the largest destabilizing effect, and the
most generous plans the least destabilizing effect. As stated above, it is
difficult to believe that the sample sizes justify these conclusions.
Second, no explanation emerges for the significant destabilizing results
for the combined negative income tax-training treatment. The training
plan, by itself, had an even smaller destabilizing effect than did the pure
negative income tax, on average and across all ethnic groups. So it is not
plausible to portray the training program as the villain in promoting
marital dissolutions. The destabilizing effect from the treatment that
combined a negative income tax and training program, particularly
among black families, remains not well explained.
Also unresolved is the issue of conflicting biases in short-duration
experiments. Are the experimental outcomes exaggerated, via the in-
tertemporal substitution effect? Or are they understated, via the lesser
present value of the incentives? This issue is particularly interesting
because Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma had emphasized that the
dissolution effect was understated by a short-duration experiment.
Their evidence was their report of a stronger destabilizing effect of the
five-year plans, and their claim was that a permanent plan would haveFAMILY STABILITY 89
even larger destabilizing effects than the five-year plan. The results in
Table 5 appear to refute these claims. The tendency for three-year plans
to show larger annual rates of dissolution than the five-year plans is con-
sistent with intertemporal substitution playing a significant role.
One obstacle to further analysis of this issue is the fact that the five-
year controls were nonrandomly selected from among the control
groups. The 20-year plans do not offer much help on this question.
Overall, these groups had lower average annual dissolution rates over
the years when they were assigned, which were years three through
seven. However, they also were nonrandomly selected. Both the five-
year controls and the 20-year groups demonstrated the trait of
"stability" by virtue of their not having dropped out during the first
several years of the experiment. There was no practical (or statistically
significant) difference between the 20-year treatment and control groups
(results not shown), but the sample sizes were small.
What explains the contrast between the large and dramatic
destabilizing results of the earlier analysis compared to the smaller and
inconsistent patterns shown in Tables 5 and 6? The analysis of this ques-
tion is incomplete, but all of the following appear to contribute to the
new mild results:
1. Separating the NIT plan from the NIT x TR plan;
2. Eliminating couples without children from the analysis;
3.Including the couples in the 20-year plans during the years in
which these plans were in effect;
4. Permitting the 20-year couples to be part of their originally as-
signed plans during the years when the 20-year plan was not in
effect;4°
5. Including information on marital dissolutions even f they were
recorded after the date of an attrition report.
The last item refers to the apparent decision of Groeneveld,
Hannan, and Tuma to record the couple as having dropped out but not
as having dissolved their marriage, if attrition was reported first. Our
procedure helps in a small way to correct for the alleged attrition bias.
There are more dropouts among controls, and if dropouts have high
marital dissolution rates, the post-attrition information helps correct for
the bias.
Probably the greatest difference between their conclusions and
those of this study is that they emphasized results from the first three
years of the experiment including the five-year negative income tax
plans. It turns out that the results for the full five years of the experiment
are less adverse regarding the effect of a negative income tax on marital
stability. Also, the large impact of the five-year plans they report during
the first three years are dissipated when the separate plans and extra
years of the experiment are included.90 Glen G. Cain
The prevalence of reconciliations among the sample, particularly
among the experimentals, may provide a clue to the high volume of
dissolution and may suggest a way in which a negative income tax plan
might deal with dissolutions. Consider that the families in the Seattle-
Denver plans were eligible to receive a monthly payment if their in-
comes were sufficiently low. Surely they would realize that a departure
by a spouse with earnings, particularly the husband, would lead to a
quick and sharp increase in their monthly payment. The temptation to
report frequent dissolutions, along with frequent reconciliations, may be
strong on the part of a small percentage of the families. Only a few
dissolutions are required to make a substantial difference in the rate,
when the sample sizes are small and the rates are as low as 6 percent or
less per year. AFDC might provide larger benefits to "permanent"
dissolutions, but, as Groeneveld, Hannan and Tuma have suggested,
the fixed costs of "going on" AFDC may dissuade mothers from doing
so if the separation is believed to be temporary. Perhaps a negative in-
come tax requires a longer waiting period before higher payments are
made. Obviously, more than speculation is needed to determine if the
phenomenon of "temporary" dissolutions explains the high dissolution
rate among black couples covered by the NIT x TR plans. Our future
work will examine this issue.
The basic finding is, however, not about reconciliations. Rather, the
pure negative income tax plan had neither a practical nor a statistically
significant destabilizing effect on the marriages of already married
couples with children.FAMILY STABILITY 91
1Only two among many papers by the Seattle-Denver research staff will be cited at
this point. The first published article, which was especially important for being first, was
Michael T. Hannan, Nancy B. Tuma, and Lyle P. Groeneveld, "Income and Marital
Events: Evidence from an Income Maintenance Experiment," American Journal of Sociology,
82, 1977, pp. 1186-1211. The final version of their findings is "Marital Stability," in Final
Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, Volume 1, Design and Results, SRI
International, May 1983, Part V, pp. 257-383. Volume 1 will be cited hereafter as Final
Report.
2Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma review much of the literature up to 1980 in Final
Report, pp. 264-266. See also David Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, "The Impact of AFDC on
Family Structure and Living Arrangements," Report to U. S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 1984.
3Andrew J. Cherlin, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1981, pp. 10-11, 23.
4One qualification is AFDC-UP, with UP standing for "unemployed parent," an op-
tional program offering AFDC to poor married couples whose principal breadwinner is
unemployed. Now adopted by half the states, the program nevertheless has a very small
number of couples participating,
sSee the arguments and citations for a positive effect of income on marital stability in
Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma, Final Report, pp. 26~-64.
6John Bishop, "Jobs, Cash Transfers, and Marital Instability: A Review and Synthesis
of the Evidence," Journal of Human Resources, Summer 1980.
7Negative income tax plans of roughly the same level of generosity can differ in their
income guarantees and benefit-reduction rates, but I will not discuss the differential effects
on marital stability of these sorts of variations. The trade-off between guarantees and the
benefit-reduction rates was not an important issue in the analysis of marital dissolutions in
the negative income tax experiments.
8See the interesting exchange of questions and responses on this issue in a Senate
hearing on welfare reform that is reported in Gilbert Y. Steiner, The Futility of Family Policy,
Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982, pp. 101-102.
9Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma cite several studies that Support this argument in
their research review. See Final Report, pp. 265, 270. See also Ellwood and Bane, "The
Impact of AFDC," 1984.
18I am grateful to James Albrecht, for aiding my consideration of this issue. See his
"Hare [sic] Today, Gone Tomorrow: Divorce, Unemployment, and Other Sorry States,"
in K. Lang and J. Leonard, eds., Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets, London:
Basil Blackwell, 1986.
l~For further discussion of some of the features of the Seattle-Denver experiment that
created incentives for creating new family units, see Gary Christophersen, Final Report of
the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, Volume 2, Mathematica Policy Research,
May 1983, especially pp. 37-51.
~2Final Report, 266-269.
13Arlene Waksberg, "Overview of Master File System with Particular Attention to the
Operational Flow of Family Composition Data," p. 24. This was originally published by
SRI in January 1979 and is reprinted in the documentation for the Seattle-Denver data
tapes provided by the National Archives. Waksberg noted that obtaining "Affidavits of
Separation" was "done in a nonrigorous fashion" (p.24).
14The description of the training-and-counseling treatments used in the Seattle-
Denver experiment does suggest their individuality along several dimensions. See
Katherine P. Dickinson and Richard W. West, "Impacts of Counseling and Education Sub-
sidy Programs," Final Report, especially pp. 201-216.
lSFinal Report, pp. 291-292.
~6In the Seattle-Denver experiment a minimum monthly payment of $20 was paid to
experimental families who filed their monthly reporting forms. Smaller payments were
made to a subset of control families who were asked to file reports. These payments un-
doubtedly kept attrition lower than it otherwise would have been. See Christophersen,
pp. 65-68.
~TFor the evidence supporting these generalizations about attrition, see Robert G.
Spiegelman, "’History and Design," Final Report, pp. 30-32.92 Glen G. Cain
18For references to personal problems, participation in public welfare programs,
geographic mobility, and marital dissolution in connection with attrition, see David N.
Kershaw and Jerilyn Fair, The New Jersey Income-Maintenance Experi~nent, Vol. I, New York:
Academic Press, 1976, pp. 119-127.
19On page 239 of the microfiche description of the Seattle-Denver experiment that is
~a
rovided by the National Archives we are told only that: "Later, a sample of the control
milies was selected to be interviewed for the same length of time as 5-year financials
[5-year NIT experimentals]."
20See Philip K. Robins and Gary L. Steiger, "An Analysis of the Labor Supply
Response of Twenty-Year Families in the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment," SRI
unpublished paper, April 1980.
21See the longer version of this paper, available as a Discussion Paper from the
Institute of Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin. This will
hereafter be cited as Cain, "Discussion Paper."
22For a discussion of these reporting differences and the judgment that they led to a
slight bias toward more reporting of splits by experimental families than by control
families, see Waksberg, "’Overview of Master File System."
23Groeneveld, Hannan and Tuma, Final Report, p. 357. On page 310 the authors sug-
gest that "reasonable adjustments for attrition bias are on the order of 10 percent for blacks
and 5 percent for whites." Also, the dissolution effect they report for all couples is about 5
percent higher than that for couples with children. Therefore, the researchers’ estimates of
58 and 51 percent reported above correspond in their other reported results to estimates of
64 and 56 percent.
24Hannan, Tuma and Groeneveld, "Income and Marital Events," 1977, p. 120.
25Tuma, Hannan and Groeneveld, "Dynamic Analysis of Event Histories," American
Journal of Sociology, 84, January 1979, pp. 835-836; and Groeneveld, Hannan and Tuma,
"The Effects of Negative Income Tax Programs on Marital Dissolution," Journal of Human
Resources, 14, Fall 1980, pp. 664-665.
26Isabel V. Sawhill, George E. Peabody, Carol A. Jones, Steven B. Caldwell, "Income
Transfers and Family Structure," Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, September
1975.
27For the evidence and citations for these claims, see Cain, "Discussion Paper."
28Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma in particular expressed skepticism that the AFDC
system had an important destabilizing effect on marriage. See Final Report, p. 266.
29For further discussion of Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma’s rather complicated
explanation of their findings regarding the different levels of negative income tax plans,
see Cain, "Discussion Paper."
3OFinal Report, pp. 358-362; "Income and Marital Events," 1977, pp. 1208-1209.
31Steiner also questioned the "certainty" hypothesis, but it is not clear that he was
referring to the short run of immediate payments. See Steiner, 1982, p. 109. On the other
hand, if Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma claim that certainty affects the steady state
dissolution rate in the short run, they must argue that the temporary wait for AFDC
benefits is sufficient to permanently dissuade the mother from her intended "’permanent"
separation or divorce. Would the woman choose a "permanent" divorce if she can receive
negative income tax payments for, say, three months but not so choose if she has to wait
three months for AFDC benefits?
32Bishop argues for a stigma effect of transfer payments that destabilizes marriages,
but his hypothesis is nearly the opposite of that ofGroeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma. In
Bishop’s view, negative income tax payments stigmatize the husband, demeaning his role
as a provider, and in this way promote marital breakups. See Bishop, "Jobs, Cash
Transfers, and Marital Instability," 1980. In contrast, the Seattle-Denver researchers argue
that because negative income tax payments have relatively little stigma, they will be
chosen by a divorced mother as a source of income support that she has shunned when it
is available through AFDC.
3SChristophersen, Final Report, Vol. 2, pp. 10-12.
34We use the data for the same couples as were used by Groeneveld, Hannan, and
Tuma, except that we restricted our analysis to couples with dependent children (under
age 21) at the beginning of the experiment, and we discarded a few cases in which either
spouse died. Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma had discarded cases in which the wife died.
(I use the plural pronoun in discussing the reanalysis to acknowledge the contribution of
Douglas Wissoker.) Although an analysis of a related outcome that measures the timeFAMILY STABILITY 93
when children are without both parents as a result of a marital dissolution is underway,
these results are not presented here. This latter outcome is based on the information on
reconciliations, which will be only briefly referred to in this paper.
35The level of normal earnings, in seven categories, is defined as "expected family in-
come for the year prior to the start of the experiment, and was derived from preenrollment
interview data." Christophersen, Final Report, p. 61.
36Perhaps surprisingly, the (NIT x TR)-Control difference in the dissolution rate for
the five-year group of blacks is not statistically significant at conventional levels, even
though the NIT x TR rate, .131, is 70 percent higher than the Control rate, .077. The
P-value for the two-sided test of significance is .155. The numbers of observations used in
these t~sts of significance are derived from the person-years of record, which are about
three times as large as the numbers of couples. Thus, the levels of significance may be
overstated. For example, the marital records for 10 couples for one year should convey
more information than the record of one couple for 10 years. If this view is correct, the
criterion for judging a difference to be statistically significant should be more stringent
than usual.
37More precisely, the multiplier equals e raised to the power of the coefficient. A coeffi-
cient of .10, for example, implies that the group’s dissolution rate is 1.105 times as large as
the control group’s dissolution rate (e    = 1.105). A coefficient as large as .76, however,
implies a multiplier of 2.14, showing a 114 percent increase in the group’s dissolution rate
compared to the control group. A coefficient of -.12 indicates a multiplier of .887--about a
11 percent reduction in the group’s dissolution rate compared to the control group.
38Paul D. Allison, "Discrete-time Methods for the Analysis of Event Histories," in
S. Leinhardt, ed., Sociological Methodology, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982, pp. 61-98.
39In Table 7 Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma show four variables for the training pro-
grams, but they combine the NIT and (NIT x TR) programs, distinguishing only the three-
and five-year durations by an additive three-year dummy variable. Their specification is
approximately equivalent to one in which all nine NIT and (NIT x TR) variables in Table 5
are combined, which becomes equivalent to the Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma "NIT"
variable, and in which all three-year NIT and three-year (NIT x TR) variables in Table 5 are
combined, which becomes equivalent to the Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma "NIT, 3yr"
variable.
40At least I believe this is a change from the Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma pro-
cedure; they state: "... we omitted the marital histories of the 20-year families after they
were assigned to the 20-year treatment. Their marital histories prior to that time (about 2
years after enrollment) are included. In our analyses all experimental families who become
20-year families are classified as 5-year experimental families until the length of treatments
is changed." Final Report, p. 287, footnote 1. However, Robins and Steiger, 1980, had
claimed that the experimental families who became 20-year families were all originally
assigned to the three-year experimental plan.Discussion
David T. Ellwood
In reading Glen Cain’s paper, I was reminded of Harry Truman’s
expressed desire for a one-handed economist. Cain has done a careful
job of discussing all the "one hands" and "other hands" that can con-
taminate an experiment of this sort when looking at marital dissolution.
And he shows us just how unstable the results of the Seattle-Denver
income maintenance experiments really are. Yet in reading this paper
one is left with the fundamental question: what should we believe about
a negative income tax and marital stability? In the end I certainly come
away convinced by Cain’s assertion that the evidence that a negative
income tax is strongly destabilizing is not decisive; but I cannot fully
endorse the impression of Cain’s last paragraph that the experiments
showed neither a practical nor a statistically significant destabilizing
effect. Rather I’d say the evidence is just too thin to draw firm
conclusions.
Three questions are paramount as we evaluate the possible impact
that a negative income tax might have. First, should we have expected
the negative income tax to be stabilizing or destabilizing for marriage?
Second, what, if anything, do the experimental results show? And final-
ly, how likely is it that the experimental results are a good reflection of
what would actually occur if a "permanent" nationwide negative in-
come tax were adopted?
What Should We Have Expected?
I was not a participant or observer during much of the period when
~Associate Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Har-
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the negative income tax was being proposed and debated. But my im-
pression from my reading and discussions was that proponents general-
ly expected the program would be stabilizing. Personally, I think the ex-
pectation should have been that the plans, at least as implemented in
the experiments, would be destabilizing.
An economic model of divorce or separation would suggest that cur-
rently married couples compare the net benefits of being married to the
net benefits of being apart. Compared to a situation where there are no
benefits available to anyone, a negative income tax has an ambiguous
impact in theory. It provides added income to both poor intact families
and poor separated ones. But in practice, the negative income tax would
almost certainly be more destabilizing than doing nothing.
The financial position of intact families is very different from the
position of separated ones. Two-parent families are rarely poor, and
when they are, their poverty tends to be short-lived. Single-parent
families are typically poor, and the poverty often lasts much longer.
Thus the expected benefit to single-parent families is far greater than
that for two-parent families. Of course a lack of income may be a
destabilizing factor in some divorces or separations, but for the most
part lack of money is likely to be a far greater problem for the split family
than for the intact one. Thus even though a negative income tax appears
to be neutral, it is in fact a far greater subsidy to single-parent families
than to two-parent families.
Of course the proper comparison is not between the negative in-
come tax and nothing, it is between the negative income tax and the
present system. If the effect of the negative income tax was to leave ef-
fective benefits for single-parent families unchanged and to increase the
economic benefits only to two-parent families, the program ought to be
mildly stabilizing. But the bulk of the tested programs offered benefits
far more generous than those of the existing AFDC system. Moreover,
the program provided far more information on available benefits and
options than would generally be known among the general public with
respect to the AFDC program. Thus, although these negative income tax
programs could have been stabilizing, I think it was reasonable to expect
they would have the opposite effect.
What Do the Experiments Show?
Cain is very effective in showing that the results are extraordinarily
confusing and unstable. I’ve spent two days and nights, poring over
Cain’s detailed numbers looking for patterns, trying to pull out what
message there is. In the end, I come away mostly frustrated, unable to
say anything but the most equivocal statements.96 David T. Ellwood
The reason really is quite simple. The sample sizes are very small
and divorce or separation is a relatively rare event. The entire control
group of originally intact families in Seattle numbers 263, of which 31
split up and 53 dropped out of the experiment. Breaking these even into
racial groups leaves one with almost no sample. Any further breaks
leave almost nothing to examine. And attrition seems quite worrisome.
As Cain makes quite clear, there are very good reasons to expect far less
attrition among experimental families that split apart (since they benefit
more from the negative income tax) than among those that remain
stable.
What makes matters worse is that the experiments included not only
several sites and racial groupings but also enormous variation in the
treatments received. Participants received dramatically different levels
of benefits. And some experimentals were offered a variety of training
and counseling programs in addition to the negative income tax benefits
or instead of them. With such thin data, it is ahnost impossible to disen-
tangle any of the independent effects of one program or another.
Cain argues that we ought to look mostly at the groups that received
a "pure" negative income tax with no training or counseling. This is one
of the few parts of the paper I found quite unconvincing. Separating the
"pure" negative income tax groups from the others thins an already
thin sample. Cain finds no evidence that the training and counseling
programs alone have much separate effect. And he cannot offer much a
priori reasoning as to why we should expect an interactive train-
ing/negative income tax impact. The main reason for separately
estimating a "pure NIT" effect and an "NIT/training" effect appears to
be that the impacts seem larger for the latter group. But with such thin
data, surely there are many divisions that would also show highly dif-
ferential impacts.
I can surely understand why one would want to include separate
treatment variables for the negative income tax and training, but I do not
see why we should so severely limit our sample sizes in order to allow
for an interactive effect of the NIT/training treatment combination. To
my knowledge none of the labor supply models employed such a
methodology, even though one could argue more directly for a possibly
joint effect in that situation. Nor can we say, if a negative income tax
plan were actually implemented, whether or not it would be accom-
panied by a training-like component.
Normally the way we deal with small samples is to pool. But we do
so at our peril, of course. These data show little consistency across sites
and treatments. Cain’s "pure NIT" was stabilizing for blacks in Seattle
but strongly destabilizing for them in Denver. Chicanos, on the other
hand, were stabilized in Denver. Results for whites were similarly
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tremely high. One clearly cannot infer much from these data. The
samples are simply too small and unstable to say anything definitive.
Yet the percentage point estimates are troubling. The overall effect
of the negative income tax was to push up family splits among whites by
18 percent, and among blacks close to 50 percent. Even if one looks only
at the "pure NIT" as Cain urges, destabilizing effects in the range of 15
to 30 percent are found for whites and blacks. The confusing Chicanos
showed a moderately stabilizing pattern. Even though few results are
significant, I conclude that there is almost no evidence in these results to
suggest the Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiments were
stabilizing; however, I do not think we can say just how large the
destabilizing effects were. It is worth remembering that significant
impacts were not found in other experimental sites.
Would the Results Be the Same
for a National Negative Income Tax?
I see no reason to infer much from these results. Cain points out that
a short-duration experiment could have a smaller than actual effect
because people cannot count on the support indefinitely, or a larger
than actual effect if people divorce now while there is an unusually
generous basis for support. I strongly favor the latter hypothesis.
Divorce or separation is certainly a "threshold" event where some im-
petus ultimately pushes people into action. It is also an event that may
have a short time horizon. Many couples see separations as temporary
or exploratory. Moreover, most separated women remarry or reconcile
rather quickly. Finally, I doubt many women who go on welfare after a
divorce see it as anything more than a temporary bridge. Data on the
AFDC program show that formerly married women have the shortest
durations on welfare.
The negative income tax may have been seen as a unique moment
when a transition into another living arrangement was easier. And the
information and attention that experimentals received may have
brought the financial options into clearer focus. Some evidence for the
proposition that information could have had an impact in and of itself
comes from the fact that Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma found large
destabilizing effects even for plans where benefits were no higher than
under current AFDC programs, which pay only for single parents.
Theory is unambiguous in suggesting that a program that leaves
benefits unchanged for single parents while providing new benefits to
two-parent families should be stabilizing. The fact that such plans were
destabilizing suggests that information or some other factor con-98 David T. Ellwood
taminated the results. And one possible interpretation of the apparently
higher impact of the negative income tax/training counseling combina-
tion could be that these programs helped people see how the negative
income tax might help them in the short run. (I still do not think this ex-
planation is plausible enough to justify special treatment of the option,
however.)
In general, then, I think we learned very little from the negative
income tax experiments with respect to divorce and separation. We
learned that the experiments did not stabilize families and that they may
have been destabilizing. But since I have argued that we should have
expected that result anyway, I’m not sure that is very valuable informa-
tion. I am less skeptical than Cain about the prospects for learning
something about these events through experimentation. I think the big-
gest problem here was that sample sizes were small. But I do believe that
these events are inherently difficult to study and are likely to be severely
influenced by the experimental design itself, independent of the changed
incentives that may be created. Yet social scientists interested in poverty
must explore these issues, perplexing and ephemeral as they may seem,
for family structure changes and poverty are inextricably and increas-
ingly related.Discussion
Nancy Brandon Tuma*
Glen Cain’s paper has "two main messages:" (1) "that the evidence
[about the effects of the negative income tax experiments on marital
stability] is not decisive, or even persuasive;" and (2) "that family issues
like marital stability are not well-suited to experimental research." I will
comment on each.
Is the Evidence Decisive or Persuasive?
Is the evidence about the effects of negative income tax treatments
on marital stability decisive or persuasive? Cain says "no" to both parts
of this question. I agree with him that the evidence is not decisive, but I
disagree with him about whether it is persuasive.
A decisive result is rare in any experiment, whether it tests a new
drug for treating cancer or a new weapons system. At best, most ex-
perimental results turn out to be "persuasive" or "suggestive." That is,
they alter one’s best guess (and hypotheses for the next study), but they
are almost never so definitive that a next study is unnecessary.
Our analyses (I refer to those by Groeneveld, Hannan and myself,
and especially those described in our final report) convinced me that the
negative income tax treatments decreased the marital stability of low-
income black and white couples.1 Cain’s reanalyses, which are, in fact,
very similar to various analyses included in our final report, have not
altered my conclusions. Although a detailed comparison of our 125-page
final report and Cain’s paper is not possible here, I will summarize what
I consider to be the most salient points.
*Professor of Sociology, Stanford University,100 Nancy B. Tuma
Cain presents results for analyses that differ from ours in a number
of relatively minor ways, many of which had already been explored in
our report and were known (from our reported results) to decrease
somewhat the negative income tax’s effect on the marital breakup rate of
black and white couples. When all of these minor changes are put
together, Cain finds a positive but statistically insignificant effect of
what he calls a "pure" negative income tax treatment on the marital
breakup rate of black and white couples.
The statistical insignificance of Cain’s finding is no surprise because
the power of hypotheses tests about marital breakup rates using the
Seattle-Denver data is low. In order to achieve statistical significance,
both our analyses and Cain’s found that the negative income tax
treatments would have to increase the marital breakup rate by roughly
40 percent for black and white couples (and by over 80 percent for the
much smaller sample of Chicano couples); hence, increases in the break-
up rate that are smaller than 40 percent cannot be statistically dis-
tinguished from "no effect," although they may be big enough to be of
considerable social significance.
Even if one accepts Cain’s analytic decisions that act to reduce the
negative income tax effects, his "pure" effect (see his table 6) is still
positive and large enough to be noteworthy: his estimated increase in
the marital breakup rate is 17 percent for whites and 31 percent for
blacks. Moreover, the "impure" effect of combined negative income
tax-training treatments is as large and positive as the "pure" effect for
whites and much larger for blacks. Most people would not ignore the
"impure" effect of the combined treatments, especially since the
"pure" training effect is tiny for whites and moderate for blacks.
In addition, one may not want to accept Cain’s analytic decisions for
the following reasons:
(1) Cain omits childless couples because he believes that any
negative income tax programs passed by Congress would exclude them
from benefits. I contend that our job as social scientists is to analyze all of
the data. We recognized that the presence of children might affect
response, so we did estimate some models with separate effects for
couples with and without children. We found (Groeneveld, Hannan,
and Tuma 1983, table 5.8, pp. 298-99) that the negative income tax
effects for couples with children were smaller than those given in our
summary in the case of whites (a 36 percent increase rather than a 53
percent increase) but were about the same for blacks. That is, the
negative income tax effect was in the "40 to 60 percent" range (a sum-
mary figure from our conclusion on which Cain focuses) for blacks, but a
little less for whites.
(2) When Cain analyzes similar data using the same explanatory
variables with a similar model, his estimates (table 7) are only aboutDISCUSSION 101
80 percent as large as ours. (This applies to effects of nonexperimental
variables as well as experimental treatments.) I suspect that his
estimates are smaller than ours because he aggregates the data based on
the date of the dissolution. (Cain aggregates to six-month intervals; we
recorded events to the nearest day.) Although Monte Carlo studies are
needed to say for sure, time aggregation probably biases estimates
downward. Cain’s decision certainly has no known scientific advan-
tages.
(3) Due to the small sample size relative to the number of treatment
and assignment variables, analysts of these data cannot cross-classify by
all treatments and assignment variables. Cain chose to ignore one set of
cross-classifications; we chose another. Naturally, results depend on
these choices. Whose choice is better? Two differences in our choices
stand out:
(a) Cain stresses a model that includes an interaction between train-
ing (actually, a mixture of three quite different treatments) and the
negative income tax treatment (a grouping of 11 different financial
plans). Like Cain, we estimated a model that interacted the negative in-
come tax treatment with the training treatments, but we separated the
three training treatments, which we regarded as quite different. We
found that the set of interactions was not significant for blacks but was
significant for whites (Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma 1983, table 5.B.2,
pp. 371-72). We were skeptical about these results, however, because
the pattern of effects for various treatments was unsystematic. We
thought that the data were cross-classified so much that chance varia-
tions due to small cell sizes swamped any trends. Omitting the negative
income tax-training interactions gives what we consider to be a clearer
view of the overall effects on the negative income tax treatments.
(b) Cain handles plan length (length of treatment) differently than
we did. In our view, having a five-year plan rather than a three-year
plan is analogous to giving a drug to cancer patients in two strengths,
the first more potent than the second. In this parallel situation, analysts
do not regard the two treatments as entirely unrelated. Rather, they test
whether the effects of the two doses differ. If patients given the stronger
dose respond to the drug significantly, and patients given the weaker
dose have a similar but smaller and insignificant response (essentially
what we found), most analysts conclude that the drug does have an
effect, but that one dose was too weak for its effect to be detected with
the data available. This reasoning led us to stress the effects of the five-
year plan.2
Cain’s approach is quite different. In his table 5 he interacts plan
length with site and his three treatment components: training, negative
income tax, and negative income tax-training. I do not see any scientific
reason for his approach here, but I would predict that spreading the102 Nancy B. Tuma
treatment effects across 13 treatment variables is extremely unlikely to
yield systematic or significant effects. In table 6 he omits not only the site
and plan length interactions, but also a main effect for plan length. This
is like treating weak and ~trong doses of a drug as equivalent. I do not
see any scientific grounds for this.
Finally, there is a piece of evidence from our final report that Cain
does not mention and that helps convince me that the negative income
tax treatments did increase marital breakup rates. Namely, we also
analyzed pooled data from the Seattle, Denver, and New Jersey ex-
periments, which increases the overall sample size substantially. The
larger sample increases the power of tests and greatly reduces the stan-
dard errors of estimated effects. These analyses gave estimates of signifi-
cant, 25 to 35 percent increases in the marital breakup rates of white,
black, and Hispanic couples (Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma 1983,
table 5.11, p. 303). Further study is needed because we did find some
important variations with site.3 Still, the evidence from the pooled ex-
perimental data is persuasive that the negative income tax treatments
tended to have some positive effect on marital breakup rates of low-
income couples in diverse settings.
In comparing Cain’s analyses and ours above, I have stressed dif-
ferences that in principle can be evaluated objectively. Another dif-
ference may arise from our disciplinary perspectives. As an economist,
Cain stresses monetary differences between the negative income tax
treatments and welfare programs like aid to families with dependent
children (AFDC). As sociologists, we consider nonmonetary as well as
monetary differences in these programs. Much of our final report was
devoted to analyses that tried to understand why a negative income tax
program that was financially similar to AFDC increased marital breakup
rates. Indeed, we thought this "message" was as important as
numerical estimates of an overall negative income tax effect on marital
stability, which is what Cain emphasizes. Since Cain "assumes away"
this part of our message, I will restate it.
We argued that administration of AFDC and of the experimental
negative income tax programs differed in several key ways that could
cause differential response to the same monetary benefits. (1) Knowl-
edge of benefits and rules is likely to be lower for AFDC than for the
negative income tax programs, which were carefully explained initially
and again a year later. (2) The costs in time, effort, and social embarrass-
ment of getting benefits is greater with AFDC than with the negative in-
come tax treatments. The latter, for example, required only a monthly
mailed report of income and family composition, and the same report
was to be sent whether or not a breakup occurred. (3) Promptness and
the short-run certainty of receiving benefits after a breakup were greater
in the negative income tax program than with AFDC, again because noDISCUSSION 103
special action on the part of a recipient was required after a breakup in
order for benefits to begin or to be increased (if the couple was already
receiving benefits). Unfortunately, with the data from the Seattle-
Denver income maintenance experiment, one cannot assess the relative
importance of these differences between AFDC and the experimental
negative income tax programs. But we think that together they account
for the relatively large increase in marital breakup rates under negative
income tax treatments financially similar to AFDC.
Three final points about nonmonetary differences between AFDC
and negative income tax programs deserve mention. First, although the
administration of the experimental negative income tax programs made it
easy for people to benefit from them, a federal program might not be
administered in a similar way. Second, one could experimentally vary
administrative features of a negative income tax program and study the
consequences. Third, if administrative features are important, as we
argued, and if the administrative features of a federal negative income
tax program are different from those in the Seattle-Denver experiment,
then neither our numerical estimates of negative income tax effects nor
Cain’s are a good basis for estimating the costs of a proposed federal
program.
Are Family Issues Suited to Experimental Research?
What about Cain’s other message? Should family issues be studied
experimentally? Cain says "no," primarily, it appears, because he
believes the cost of a well-designed experimental study would be "too
high." Deciding if one agrees with Cain requires a cost-benefit analysis
involving answers to three questions:
(1) What would a well-designed experimental study of family issues
look like? What would it cost? No one has yet tried to design such a
study, let alone estimate its cost. Thus, a very basic piece of evidence
for Cain’s view is missing.
(2) What would it cost to obtain the same information by other
means? The most likely other source of such information would be
analyses of nonexperimental data, for example, panel surveys. Not
only would a good nonexperimental study of family issues be costly,
but it quite possibly might be more costly than a well-designed exo
periment.4
(3) How valuable is knowledge about the relationship between social
policies and family issues? Whatever the cost of a study of family
issues, some people may think it is "too high" simply because they
don’t value the information it produces.104 Nancy B. Tuma
Since Cain has not yet given serious answers to (1) or (2), let alone
said how much he thinks such information is worth to our society, I am
totally unconvinced by his claim that the costs of a properly designed ex-
perimental study of family issues would be "too high."
I am convinced, however, that someone needs to think hard about
how to design good experimental and nonexperimental studies of family
issues, so that debate about the value of such studies can move from the
level of rough and ready speculation to one with a sound scientific basis.
And, while I am persuaded that the experimental negative income tax
programs tended to decrease marital stability of low-income couples, I
also think estimates of the magnitude of these effects (both ours and
Cain’s) are not sufficiently precise for policy planning. Moreover, the
negative income tax experiments definitely did not give adequate infor-
mation on the role of nonmonetary features of the treatments. If there is
another set of negative income tax experiments someday, I hope that
they will be designed not only to obtain more precise estimates of effects
of plan generosity but also to study this important issue.DISCUSSION 105
1Like Cain, we concluded that the negative income tax treatments did not alter the
marital breakup rate of Chicanos couples. However, we did find that they markedly
decreased the marital formation rate of unmarried Chicana women with children, and this
is an alternative way of decreasing marital stability. So, while I think the evidence shows
that the negative income tax treatments decreased the marital stability of Chicanos, this
cannot be detected from analyses of data on marital breakups from the Seattle-Denver
income maintenance experiment. See Groenveld, Hannan, and Tuma 1983.
2Cain suggests that his results may differ from ours partly due to different handling of
those assigned to the 20-year plan. As far as I can tell from his paper, Cain treated them
exactly the same as we did. In any case, I’m skeptical that somewhat different handling of
fewer than 10 percent of the sample would cause appreciable differences, especially since
our analyses focused on the first 36 months of data and the 20-year plan only began after
about 30 months.
3The effects of the negative income tax treatments on marital breakup rates were
somewhat smaller for whites in New Jersey than for whites in Seattle and Denver. Con-
trarily, the effects were much larger for Hispanics in New Jersey (mainly Puerto Ricans)
than for Hispanics in Denver (mainly Chicanos). The variation with site could arise
because of cultural, ethnic, or religious differences in the populations in the three sites.
They could also be partly due to differences in state programs of aid to families with
dependent children; these differences cause control group comparisons to differ even if
the negative income tax plans are the same. However, the negative income tax treatments
in New Jersey also differed in a number of ways from those in Seattle and Denver, so this
is yet another possible reason for differences across sites. Still other reasons for site dif-
ferences can be suggested.
4Since available nonexperimental data on family issues and income are still very inade-
quate, a good nonexperimental study would almost certainly involve costs of data collec-
tion as well as analysis. And, since the costs of the negative income tax experiments came
disproportionately from data collection and analyses--not from administration of treat-
ments (see Zellner and Rossi 1986)--a nonexperimental study might not cost much less
than an experimental study with the same number of cases. Moreover, sample sizes must
usually be much larger in a nonexperimental study than in an experimental study, in order
to estimate effects with equal precision. As a result, a good nonexperimental study of
family issues could be more costly than a well-designed experiment. This ignores likely
biases in nonexperimental studies, which are even harder to handle than the two sources
of bias that Cain associates with an experiment.
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